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The above article (DOI: <DOI HREF="10.1002/ijfe.373">10.1002|ijfe.373</DOI>) was published online in Early View on 25 July 2008. <P>On page 1 of the initial online publication of this article, the third author's surname was incorrectly spelled. The correct spelling should be: KAREN HOVSEPIAN.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040078
ABSTRACT This paper develops and simulates a model of a Bayesian market maker who transacts with noise and position traders in derivative markets. The impact of noise trading is examined relative to price determination in FX futures, noise transmission from futures to options, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005070482
The impact of separating cash flow and votes depends on the ownership structure. In widely held firms, one share - one vote is in general not optimal. While it ensures an efficient outcome in bidding contests, dual-class shares mitigate the free-rider problem, thereby promoting takeovers. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207221
In many bilateral transactions, the seller fears being underpaid because its outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize a variety of observed contracts as solutions to such smart buyer problems. The key to these solutions is to grant the seller upside participation. In contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493164
We examine whether a bidder can use tender offer terms to signal post-takeover security benefits. Neither restricted bids nor cash-equity offers allow the bidder to reveal private information. Since atomistic shareholders extract all the gains in security benefits, signaling equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493185
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This paper analyzes how non-voting shares affect the takeover outcome in a single-bidder model with asymmetric information and private benefit extraction. In equilibrium, the target firm's security-voting structure influences the bidder's participation constraint and in response the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136737
This paper analyzes how non-voting shares affect the takeover outcome in a single-bidder model with asymmetric information and private benefit extraction. In equilibrium, the target firm’s security-voting structure influences the bidder’s participation constraint and in response the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027684
We study sex trafficking in a marriage market model of prostitution. When traffickers can coerce women to sell sex, trafficked prostitutes constitute a non-zero share of supply in any unregulated market for sex. We ask if regulation can eradicate trafficking and restore the equilibrium that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735267