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Power, rent extraction, and executive compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian; Fried, Jesse - In: CESifo Forum 3 (2002) 3, pp. 23-28
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998677
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Corporate Governance: A New Limit to Real Options Valuation?*
Philippe, Henri - In: Journal of Management and Governance 9 (2005) 2, pp. 129-149
Including real options in firms ’ value raises numerous difficulties. Limitations concerning the relevance of option pricing models outside financial markets are the most salient, but carrying out a valuation implies other assumptions, especially on firms’ governance. In particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005698984
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Asymmetry between insiders and outsiders: Aspects of valuation duality
Bukhvalov, Alexander V. - Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State … - 2008
The paper deals with a modification of CAPM, which takes into account distinction between insiders as agents who actually determine the managerial decisions in the company, and outsiders, which are identifi ed as all other investors who do not have direct infl uence on managerial decisions. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458652
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The role of corporate governance in the write-off decision
Minnick, Kristina - In: Review of Financial Economics 20 (2011) 4, pp. 130-145
The recent popularity of write-offs allows for examination of the role governance plays in the write-off decision. I find that well governed companies are more likely to announce write-offs. Additionally, better governed firms announce smaller write-offs relative to poorly governed firms. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010875033
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Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance
Cuñat, Vicente; Giné, Mireia; Guadalupe, Maria - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959767
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CEO control, corporate performance and pay-performance sensitivity
Amzaleg, Yaron; Azar, Ofer H.; Ben-Zion, Uri; … - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 106 (2014) C, pp. 166-174
Agency theory suggests that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of CEO's compensation is an important motivation mechanism to the CEO to improve corporate performance. We develop a simple model that suggests that reverse causality should also be considered. Specifically, our model predicts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930943
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Corporate Governance, Bank Mergers and Executive Compensation
Liu, Yan; Padgett, Carol; Varotto, Simone - Henley Business School, University of Reading - 2014
Using a sample of US bank mergers from 1995 to 2012, we observe that the pre-post merger changes in CEO bonus are significantly negatively related to the strength of corporate governance within the bidding bank. This suggests that bonus compensation is not consistent with the “optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210429
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What Explains the Rise in CEO Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009
Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279348