by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games …

by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games …

This paper studies the properties of convexity (concavity) and strategic complements (substitutes) in network formation … and the implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity … shown that there always exists a pairwise stable network as long as the utility function of each player satisfies convexity …

The science of social networks is a central field of sociological study, a major application of random graph theory … focus on the formal modeling of social networks and the two major types of models: those based on random graphs and those … network modeling approaches. …

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71 …, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between … results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be "too dense" in a well …

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71 …, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between … general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be “too dense” in a well …

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … network or only on the link itself. A final aspect is whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming … links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects is …

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … network or only on the link itself. A final aspect is whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming … links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects is …

Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of … network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent …. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the network link marginal payoffs such that the set of pairwise stable …