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In this paper we propose a static model describing the commercial exploitation of a common property renewable resource by a population of agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the utility of their group while defectors maximize their own profit. Agents aren't assumed to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005628771
We model an International Environmental Agreement as a two stages game: during the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the agreement while, in the second stage, the quantity of emissions reduction is choosen. Players determine their abatement levels in a dynamic setting,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465197
The paper investigates the stability of the International Environmental Agreement in a model of emission reduction. We consider a two stage game, in which in the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the agreement while, in the second stage, the quantity of emissions reduction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528380
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In this paper we study the formation and the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in a pollution abatement model with a quadratic cost function. Countries play a two-stage game: in the first stage each country decides to join or not the coalition while, in the -second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144360
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In this paper we propose a numerical approach for the solution of some optimalcontrol problems arising in the field of marketing decision models. Inparticular, we account for a specific innovation diffusion model. A numericalapproach may be useful to investigate some features of state variables...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005542319
Let us consider two new perfect substitute durable products which are produced and sold in a market by two competing firms. Looking at a potential buyer, we build a stochastic rule by which she purchases the good from one of the two firms (so that she becomes an adopter). The model is considered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005434764
A coalition is usually called stable if nobody has an immediate incentive to leave or to enter the coalition since he does not improve his payoff. This myopic behaviour does not consider further deviations which can take place after the first move. Chwe (1994) incorporated the idea of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005434771