La tasa óptima de impuesto a los ingresos de capital en Estados Unidos es 36% según Conesa y otros (2009). Este resultado se deriva de un modelo de ciclo de vida y se debe a la existencia de mercado incompletos y a la oferta laboral endógena. Se muestra que este modelo tiene problemas en...

In this paper we characterize quantitatively the optimal mix of progressive income taxes and education subsidies in a model with endogenous human capital formation, borrowing constraints, income risk and incomplete financial markets. Progressive labor income taxes provide social insurance...

In this paper we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks, where households also differ permanently with respect to their ability to generate income. The welfare criterion we employ is...

This paper investigates household decisions, and optimal taxation in an overlapping generations model in which individual utility depends on a weighted average of consumption of ones peers --- a ``keeping up with the Joneses'' consumption externality. In contrast to representative agent...

Do reductions in capital income taxes attract foreign capital and, at the same time, foster economic growth? This paper examines the effect of capital income taxation on the international allocation of capital and on economic growth in a two-country overlapping generations model with endogenous...

We examine a prominent justification for capital income taxation: goods preferred by those with high ability ought to be taxed. In an environment where commodity taxes are allowed to be nonlinear functions of income and consumption, we derive an analytical expression that reveals the forces...

The optimal capital income tax rate is 36 percent as reported by Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009). This result is mainly driven by the market incompleteness as well as the endogenous labor supply in a life-cycle framework. We show that this model fails to account for the basic life-cycle...

We investigate whether late redistribution programs that can be targeted towards low income families can “dominate” early redistribution programs that cannot be targeted due to information constraints. We use simple two- period OLG models with heterogenous agents under six policy regimes: A...

This paper investigates household decisions, and optimal taxation in an overlapping generations model in which individual utility depends on a weighted average of consumption of ones peers — a “keeping up with the Joneses” consumption externality. In contrast to representative agent...