We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.

Für die Klimapolitik einzelner Länder spielt nach Ansicht von Heike Auerswald, Technische Universität Dresden, Kai A. Konrad, Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen, und Marcel Thum, Technische Universität Dresden und Niederlassung Dresden des ifo Instituts, neben der...

We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.

This paper assesses the role of the public sector in adaptation to climate change. We first offer a definition and categorisation of climate change adaptation. We then consider the primary economic principles that can guide the assignment of adaptation tasks to either the private or the public...

Die gegenwärtige im Kyoto-Protokoll festgelegte Klimapolitik versucht vorrangig, dem Klimawandel mit einer Strategie der Emissionsverminderung zu begegnen. Die dort festgelegten Reduktionsziele für den CO2-Ausstoß sind für viele Länder nicht mehr zu realisieren. Und einige Länder, die zu...

The future consequences of climate change are highly uncertain. Today, the exact size of possible future damages are widely unknown. Governments try to cope with these risks by investing in mitigation and adaptation measures. Mitigation aims at a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions whereas...

We analyse bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Incomplete information is known as one of the key reasons why negotiations may fail more generally, and why efficiency gains cannot be exploited. We ask whether unilateral...