The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically...

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Private school enrolment may lead to worse subsequent performance in further education or in the labour market. If students differ in their ability not only to pay but to take advantage of educational opportunities (“talent” for short), private schools attract a worse pool of students when...

The impact of school choice on education quality is one of the most hotly contested issues in education economics. We contribute to the debate by investigating the effect of concentration of local education markets and the number of schools in the city on the average achievements of 9th grade...

In theoretical models of residential sorting, a household's location decision is closely linked to its demand for local public services, such as schooling. Since school choice programs weaken the link between residential location and schooling options, they have the potential to affect both...

An important issue in the debate on voucher systems and school choice is what effects competition from independent schools will have on public schools. Sweden has made a radical reform of its system for financing schools. Independent and public schools operate on close to equal terms under a...

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots...

In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over students. These priority orderings depend on criteria such as whether a student lives within walking distance or has a sibling already at the school. We argue that by including just the priority orderings in the problem, and not...

A new mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others. We introduce a new framework for school-choice problems and two notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante...

To encourage diversity, branches may vary contracts' priorities across slots. The agents who match to branches, however, have preferences only over match partners and contractual terms. Ad hoc approaches to resolving agents' indifferences across slots in the Chicago and Boston school choice...