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Economic voting and economic revolutionizing? The economics of incumbency changes in European democracies and revolutionary events in the Arab World

Möller, Marie - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Westfälische … - 2011

While people in democracies can vote their government out when they are discontent with its policies, those in dictatorships cannot do so. They can only attempt to expel the dictator via mass protests or revolutions. Based on a general cause-and-effect mechanism, the author analyzes whether such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009385887

Oil and the duration of dictatorships

Cuaresma, Jesus Crespo; Oberhofer, Harald; Raschky, Paul - Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Fakultät für …

This paper develops a simple model that analyses the relationship between a country?s oil endowment and the duration of its autocratic leader. The dictator uses the rents from oil extraction for both personal gain and to pay-off potential opposition and chooses an optimal level of oil...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005427662

Oil and the Duration of Dictatorships

Cuaresma, Jesus Crespo; Oberhofer, Harald; Raschky, Paul - Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, … - 2010

This paper studies empirically the relationship between oil endowment and the duration of autocratic leaders. A simple theoretical setting shows how the relationship between oil endowment and the duration of the dictatorial regime is mediated by the price of oil. Using a dataset on 106...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008492276

Oil and the duration of dictatorships

Crespo Cuaresma, Jesus; Oberhofer, Harald; Raschky, … - Fachbereich Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, … - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493115

Oil and the duration of dictatorships

Cuaresma, Jesus Crespo; Oberhofer, Harald; Raschky, Paul - In: Public Choice 148 (2011) 3, pp. 505-530

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009327322

The Geopolitics of Oil, Gas, and Ecology in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea Basin. 1998 Caucasus Conference Report.

Garcelon, Marc; Walker, Edward W.; Patten-Wood, Alexandra; … - Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian … - 1998

; the United States and Russia have vied to influence the placement of pipeline routes; and attention to the region …'s resources has increased pressure on disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia and Georgia over … Abkhazia, and Russia and Chechnya. And all of these developments are unfolding against a backdrop of deepening ecological …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538682

Dictatorship in a Single Export Crop Economy

Berlage, Lode; Capeau, Bart; Verwimp, Philip - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2003

Is it a matter of pure altruism or shortsightedness when a dictator spends an increasing amount of his revenues for the population, while cutting on own consumption? In order to be able to consume, the dictator first has to stay in power. We present a formal model of a power maximizing dictator....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005503891

Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships

Overland, Jody; Simons, Kenneth; Spagat, Michael - Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London - 2003

We model growth in dictatorships facing each period an endogenous probaibility of "political catastrophe" that would extinguish the regime's wealth ability. Domestic capital exhibits a bifurcation point determining economic growth or shrinkage. With low initial domestic capital the dictator...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489942

When will a Dictator be Good?

Shen, Ling - In: Economic Theory 31 (2007) 2, pp. 343-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371083

Preference revelation with a limited number of indifference classes

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Spanish Economic Review 4 (2002) 2, pp. 151-158

Suppose that g is a strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of all profiles of complete and transitive binary relations that have exactly m indifference classes. If $m \ge 3$ and the range of g has three or more members, then g is dictatorial. If m = 2, then for any set X of feasible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371313