Showing 1 - 10 of 19
We develop an equilibrium model of debt maturity choice of rms, in the presence of xed issuance costs in primary debt markets, and an over-the-counter secondary debt market with search frictions. Liquidity in this market is related to the ratio of buyers to sellers, which is determined in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858774
It has been suggested (Morris, Shin 2001) that co-ordination failure between bondholders could produce an effect that would explain the systematic mispricing of corporate debt produced by the Merton (1974) framework. In essence, fear of premature foreclosure by other debtors can lead to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744890
It has been suggested (Morris, Shin 2001) that co-ordination failure between holders of debt can affect the price of debt. In essence, fear of premature foreclosure by other debtors can lead to preemptive action, affecting the value of debt. Using a continuous-time framework related to a Merton...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745604
This paper describes how structural bond pricing models can be estimated using a Simulated Maximum Likelihood procedure developed by Durbin and Koopman (1997). The approach has the advantage that price dated on any traded claim (such as bonds, equity, and credit default swaps), as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746279
Recovery rates are negatively related to default probabilities (Altman et al., 2005). This paper proposes and estimates a model in which this dependence is the result of an unobserved credit cycle: When times are bad, the default probability is high and recovery rates are low; when times are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746498
We develop an equilibrium model of debt maturity choice of firms, in the presence of fixed issuance costs in primary debt markets, and an over-the-counter secondary debt market with search frictions. Liquidity in this market is related to the ratio of buyers to sellers, which is determined in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746682
Due to limited liability, banks that are essentially insolvent may have incentives to roll over bad loans as a gamble for resurrection, even though it is socially inefficient to do so. This paper considers the problem of making such banks remove and/or foreclose bad loans, when the proportion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557245
This paper develops a tractable general equilibrium model in which money markets provide structural funding to some banks. When bank default risk becomes significant, retail deposit insurance creates an asymmetry between banks that operate in savings-rich regions, which can remain financed at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991546
One of the strengths of structural models (or firm-value based models) of credit (e.g. Merton, 1974) as opposed to reduced-form models (e.g. Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995) is that they directly link the price of equity to default probabilities, and hence to the price of corporate bonds (and credit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827085
This paper develops a continuous time asset pricing model of debt and equity in a framework where equityholders decide when to default but creditors decide when to liquidate. This framework is relevant for environments where creditors exert a significant influence on the timing of liquidation,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008551055