We investigate the importance of ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty, in executives' decisions about when to exercise stock options. We develop an empirical estimate of ambiguity and include it in regression models alongside the more traditional measure of risk, equity volatility. We show that...

This paper provides a brief overall view of the previous research carried out on gender diversity and shows how, against all expectations, the presence of women in the boardrooms cannot affect firms’ leverage and total risk. We draw on theories from psychological, social and economic issues...

In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem, in an incomplete contracting model in which the agent can be rewarded based only on financial...

The bailout of PT. Bank Century (BC) at the end of 2008 ignites many debates. If the Indonesian Central Bank had not bailed it out, would it have been a systemic disaster for Indonesian economic? BC’s total assets were not significant to the national banking asset. Why was it so important...

The literature on shareholder voting has mostly focused on the influence of proxy advisors on shareholder votes. We exploit a unique empirical setting enabling us to provide a direct estimate of management’s influence. Analyzing shareholder votes on the frequency of future say on pay votes, we...

A large body of literature suggests that CEOs have misaligned incentives to undertake acquisitions in an attempt to increase their pay. This paper shows that the likelihood of post-acquisition CEO turnover can act as a constraint on such incentives. The acquisition premium in pay decreases by...

We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market: CEO turnover and monetary remuneration schemes.Sample selection models and hazard analyses applied to a random sample of 250 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over a six-year pre-Cadbury period show that managerial...

More aggressive acquiring firms paid higher executive compensation than non or less aggressive acquiring firms. This paper applies the generalized propensity score (GPS) methodology to estimate the relationship between a firm’s acquisition and its executive compensation. Allowing for...

Despite their theoretical value in tackling principal–agent problems at low cost to firms there is almost no empirical literature on the prevalence and correlates of performance bonds posted by corporate executives. We show that they are an important feature in today's CEO labour market in...