This article analyses the effects of economic transparency on the optimal monetary policy in an economy affected by demand shocks. In an environment of imperfect common knowledge, demand shocks create a trade-off between stabilizing the price level and stabilizing the output gap. The monetary...

One of the most striking consequences of the recent episode of sovereign debt market stress in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domestic sector in fragile economies. First, we identify the shocks that explain most of the variation in this share in an...

We use laboratory experiments with human subjects to test the relevance of different inflation targeting regimes. In particular and within the standard New Keynesian model, we evaluate to what extent communication of the inflation target is relevant to the success of inflation targeting. We find...

Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to only a fraction of market participants (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but with ambiguity (partial...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

In Keynes’ beauty contest, agents have to choose actions in accordance with an expected fundamental value and with the conventional value expected to be set by the market. In doing so, agents respond to a fundamental and to a coordination motive respectively, the prevalence of either motive...

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of economic transparency in a model of monopolistic competition with imperfect common knowledge on the shocks affecting the economy where the central bank has no inflationary bias. Monetary policy entails a dual role, as an action that stabilizes the...

This paper addresses the question of whether public information destabilizes the economy in the context of signals of a different nature. We present an experimental evaluation of the speculative attack game of <link rid="b12">Morris and Shin (1998</link>). Our objective is two-fold: to evaluate whether public...

We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by different players and are likely to lead to different appreciations "ex post". This process defines players' expected private...

The disaster myopia hypothesis is a theoretical argument that may explain why crises are a recurrent event. Under very optimistic circumstances, investors disregard any relevant information concerning the increasing degree of risk. Agents’ propensity to underestimate the probability of adverse...