If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...

In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do...

In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$2 \times n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do...</equationsource></inlineequation>

Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up...

We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy...

In labor market models as well as in exchange economies with indivisible goods gross substitutability is used as a property to guarantee the existence of competitive equilibria. This paper develops an easy way to check gross substitutability for utility functions concerning a finite set of...

This paper investigates a class of dynamic selection processes for n-person normal-form games which includes the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. For (two-person) zero-sum games and for (n-person) potential games every limit set of these dynamics is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria....

According to Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972) the bargaining set of a convex game coincides with its core and the kernel consists of the nucleolus only. In this paper we prove the same properties for [Gamma]-component additive games (= graph restricted games in the sense of Owen (1986)) if...