We construct and analyze a unique database with 1992-99 information on privatization transactions and labor productivity for the entire surviving population of initially state-owned industrial corporations in Romania. The data permit us to describe the post-privatization ownership structure and...

Comprehensive panel data on privatization transactions and labor productivity in Romanian industrial corporations are used to describe the post-privatization ownership structure, and to estimate the effect of Romania's diverse privatization policies on firm performance. The econometric results...

This article discusses China’s incremental approach to SOE reform, the difficulties of continuing this approach as the need to make efficiency gains across all sectors of the economy becomes more acute, and future reform options and the challenges in carrying them out.

1997 végére Magyarországon nagyjából befejeződik a privatizáció. Ez nem jelenti azt, hogy minden eladható állami társaságot el is adnak, de azt igen, hogy a könnyen értékesíthetők addigra elfogynak. Ebben a helyzetben ismét felvetődik az a kérdés, hogy mi történjen a még...

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the performance of 450 privatized firms in Vietnam. To study the effect of changes in management and the role of state ownership on the performance of privatized firms, we utilize a panel of 450 Vietnamese firms privatized over the...

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the performance of 450 privatized firms in Vietnam. To study the effect of changes in management and the role of state ownership on the performance of privatized firms, we utilize a panel of 450 Vietnamese firms privatized over the...

We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the...

We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the...

We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly communist countries coupled with detailed “hard” information about the...