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This paper studies the organization of the internal labour market of postal services in Spain from 1890 to 1935. The paper discusses the evolution of total employment in relation to postal traffic and average nominal and real wages. The paper then analyses the operation of the internal labour...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861812
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877789
Are monetary and non-monetary incentives used as substitutes in motivating effort? I address this question in a laboratory experiment in which the choice of the job charac- teristics (i.e., the mission) is part of the compensation package that principals can use to influence agents' effort....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010941146
In this paper are presented essential themes in the subject of personnel economics. In the first part analysis has been conducted on the impact of peer pressure on workplace behaviour. Then again models for compensation structures within firms, and their influence on the utility of work by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957799
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255564
This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in the <I>Journal of Economic Psychology</I>, 31(4), 676-686.<P> We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256123
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005018695
Purpose: This paper focuses on the job satisfaction of the employees of the ready-made garment industry in Bangladesh. Introduction: Almost every country irrespective of its stage of development is engaged in garment manufacturing and trading. This industry migrates from high-wage to low-wage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009322579
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646321
By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009274519