We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed \epsilon 0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider...

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed ε0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider generic...

This paper provides a formal characterization of the process of rational learning in social networks. Agents receive initial private information and select an action out of a choice set under uncertainty in each of infinitely many periods, observing the history of choices of their neighbors....

This paper develops a model of repeated interaction in social networks among agents with differing degrees of sophistication. The focus of the model is observational learning; that is, each agent receives initial private information and makes inferences regarding the private information of...

We consider uncoupled dynamics (i.e., dynamics where each player knows only his own payoff function) that reach Pareto efficient and individually rational outcomes. We prove that the number of periods it takes is in the worst case exponential in the number of players.

We consider uncoupled dynamics (each player knows only his own payoff function) that reach outcomes that are Pareto efficient and individually rational. We show that in the worst case the number of periods it takes to reach these outcomes must be exponential in the number of players and hence...

We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with large number of players n and constant number of actions m. Our main result states that even for constant {\epsilon}, the query complexity of {\epsilon}-well supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in n.

A completely uncoupled dynamic is a repeated play of a game, where each period every player knows only his action set and the history of his own past actions and payoffs. One main result is that there exist no completely uncoupled dynamics with finite memory that lead to pure Nash equilibria...

We study the problem of reaching Nash equilibria in multi-person games that are repeatedly played, under the assumption of uncoupledness: every player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by ?finite-state automata, and characterize the minimal number...