We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed ε0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider generic...

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed \epsilon 0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider...

This paper develops a model of repeated interaction in social networks among agents with differing degrees of sophistication. The focus of the model is observational learning; that is, each agent receives initial private information and makes inferences regarding the private information of...

This paper provides a formal characterization of the process of rational learning in social networks. Agents receive initial private information and select an action out of a choice set under uncertainty in each of infinitely many periods, observing the history of choices of their neighbors....

AbstractWe study the problem of reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in multi-person games that are repeatedly played under the assumption of uncoupledness: every player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by finite-state automata, and characterize the...

We consider uncoupled dynamics (each player knows only his own payoff function) that reach outcomes that are Pareto efficient and individually rational. We show that in the worst case the number of periods it takes to reach these outcomes must be exponential in the number of players and hence...

Completely uncoupled dynamics are a repeated play of a game, where every period each player knows only his own action set and the history of his own past actions and payoffs; thus, he does not know anything about the other playerʼs actions and payoffs. The main contributions of the present...

We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most cnlogn steps for...

We consider the situation that two players have cardinal preferences over a finite set of alternatives. These preferences are common knowledge to the players, and they engage in bargaining to choose an alternative. In this they are assisted by an arbitrator (a mechanism) who does not know the...

We consider uncoupled dynamics (i.e., dynamics where each player knows only his own payoff function) that reach Pareto efficient and individually rational outcomes. We prove that the number of periods it takes is in the worst case exponential in the number of players.