We show that when a seller of a di¤erentiated good o¤ers the product allowing consumers an option to pay what they like, then all consumers will never free ride in equilibrium when their valuations of the good are positive, and, under certain conditions, all will consumers would pay. Further,...

We study a market model in which competing firms use costly marketing devices to influence the set of alternatives which consumers perceive as relevant. Consumers in our model are boundedly rational in the sense that they have an imperfect perception of what is relevant to their decision...

There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for...

We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...

A dolgozat a politikatudomány és közgazdaság-tudomány határán álló kivonulás-tiltakozás-hűség modell lényegét járja körbe. Az Albert O. Hirschman által felépített gondolati keret szemléleti frissessége és sajátos megközelítési módja rendkívül termékenyítően...

Previous research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) generally acknowledges that consumers develop more favourable perceptions of responsible firms. Yet few empirical works have focused on the effects of the firm's societal communication and of its characteristics on brand equity. In this...