We show that when a seller of a di¤erentiated good o¤ers the product allowing consumers an option to pay what they like, then all consumers will never free ride in equilibrium when their valuations of the good are positive, and, under certain conditions, all will consumers would pay. Further,...

There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for...

We study a market model in which competing firms use costly marketing devices to influence the set of alternatives which consumers perceive as relevant. Consumers in our model are boundedly rational in the sense that they have an imperfect perception of what is relevant to their decision...

We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...

We present a continuous time non-tatonnement process for frictionless and perfectly competitive markets with (possibly non-convex) production, where the natural rate of unemployment (NRU) emerges as the asymptotic value of unemployment. Consumers and producers are myopic and repeatedly...

Changes in total surplus and deadweight loss are traditional measures of economic welfare. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizing consumer demand data with a quasilinear utility function. Under these conditions, consumer surplus is a valid measure of consumer welfare....