Firms routinely allocate the costs of common corporate resources down to divisions. The main insight of this paper is that any efficient allocation rule must reflect the firm's underlying cost structure. We propose a new allocation rule (the polynomial rule), which achieves efficiency and...

This paper analyzes whether the excessive overreliance on non-interest income and wholesale funding, which occurred in the banking industry during the last two decades and led to increases in systemic risk, could arise from the desire of bank managers to increase their variable compensation....

<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>Much of the production in firms takes place over time. This paper seeks to understand the value of interim performance information on long projects. In particular, the model explores the sorting effects of performance evaluations. Conducting an interim performance evaluation increases...

Venture capitalists deliver investments to entrepreneurs in stages. This paper shows staged financing is efficient. Staging lets investors abandon ventures with low early returns, and thus sorts good projects from bad. The primary implication from staging is that it is efficient to invest more...

This study endogenously generates the asymmetric verification concept of conservatism, using evolutionary biology as a foundation. A producer produces (or hunts) a consumable with a stochastic production technology, and possibly faces a stealer thereafter, who seeks to expropriate the...

This paper analyzes whether the excessive overreliance on non-interest income and wholesale funding, which occurred in the banking industry during the last two decades and led to increases in systemic risk, could arise from the desire of bank managers to increase their variable compensation....

One of the primary roles of corporate boards is to control the processes by which top executives are assessed and if necessary replaced. CEO turnover cannot be viewed in isolation because it affects the behavior of the involved players and hence interacts with other organizational goals. This...

Various commentators have praised the WorldCom and Enron settlements for holding outside directors personally liable, arguing that heightened director liability will induce greater board oversight. This paper shows that the connection between director liability and board behavior is more subtle,...

We analyze the board of directors' equilibrium strategies for setting CEO incentive pay and overseeing financial reporting and their effects on the level of earnings management. We show that an increase in CEO equity incentives does not necessarily increase earnings management because directors...

This paper shows that a capital budgeting process in which the division manager is required to engage in personally costly influence activities prior to a project approval has beneficial incentive effects: it provides the manager with incentives to acquire costly information about project...