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Strategic Outsourcing with Technology Transfer

Kabiraj, Tarun; Sinha, Uday Bhanu - Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics - 2011

We analyze the outsourcing decision of a firm for a key input of a final good production to an independent input supplier even though the firm has an option of producing that key input in-house at a lower cost with a better technology. We find that for smaller technology gap with the independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283227

Product Market Competition and Productive Managerial Effort

Cho, Sungbin - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper analyzes a mechanism through which product market competition affects allocation of the managerial efforts … reduction (productive effort) and rent protection (unproductive effort). An increase in competition, measured by the number of … identifies the conditions under which product market competition lowers the cost of providing incentives for productive effort …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063759

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, H.; Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998

novel feature is the competition between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. Qualities of investment projects are … themselves across all offered contracts. Competition of banks introduces three possibilities for a breakdown of credit markets …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092395

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

crucial novel feature is the competition between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. The quality of investment … distribute themselves across all offered contracts. Competition between banks introduces three possibilities for a breakdown of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861

Hierarchic contracting

Sanchez, Miguel A.; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We analyze the contracting structure in a moral hazard setting with several agents where output is produced jointly and is the only contractible variable. Since the salary of each agent is a function of all agents efforts, a positive externality arises between them. This externality is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928768

Screening Minersf Skills: Coal Industry Recruiting in Early Twentieth Century Japan

Sakai, Mayo - Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo - 2013

Coal mining firms used the intermediary organization of labor called the gdormitory system.h In the 1900s, coal mining machinery was not introduced yet, traditional manual skills were dominant and firms usually did not enter the inside of their coal mines. Under these circumstances, firms did...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011211009

Separation of Ownership and Control: Delegation as a Commitment Device

Boukouras, Aristotelis - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2015

This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in fi rms. An entrepreneur hires a worker for providing effort to complete a project. The worker's effort determines the probability that the project is completed on time, but the worker receives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265723

Corruption, Extortion, and the Boundaries of the Law

Andrianova, Svetlana; Melissas, Nicolas - Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), Departamento … - 2006

We consider a set-up in which a principal must decide whether or not to legalise a socially undesirable activity. The law is enforced by a monitor who may be bribed to conceal evidence of the offence and who may also engage in extortionary practices. The principal only declares the activity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005151228

Skill-Biased Technological Change, Organizational Change, and Wage Inequality

Daido, Kohei; Tabata, Ken - School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University - 2012

We build a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with moral hazard contracting to examine the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653992

Procrastination in Teams, Contract Design and Discrimination

Weinschenk, Philipp - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009226922

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