The text explores generally whether recommendations relating to deposit insurance are international guidleines or mandatory rules, explores the role of deposit insurance as one of several elements in the financial safety net, and offers an outlook to a future with more research and cross-border...

There is general agreement that banking supervision and resolution have to be organised at the same level. It is often argued, however, that there is no need to tackle deposit insurance because it is politically too sensitive. This note proposes to apply the principles of subsidiarity and...

This review discusses the history of narrow banks, reform proposals involving narrow banks, and theory and empirical evidence regarding whether narrow banks should play a more prominent role in the financial system. Prior to the early-twentieth century, US banks tended to be much narrower than...

In August 2007 the United Kingdom experienced its first bank run in over 140 years. Although Northern Rock was not a particularly large bank (it was at the time ranked 7th in terms of assets) it was nevertheless a significant retail bank and a substantial mortgage lender. In fact, ten years...

There is substantial evidence that new banks and rapidly growing banks are risk prone. We study this problem by designing a relationship-lending model in which a bank operates as a financial intermediary and centralised monitor. In the absence of deposit insurance, the bank’s limited liability...

The 2007–2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy. We provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. In our model the...

This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some...

This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some...