We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for...

In a principal-agent model we analyze the firm's decision to adopt an informal or a standardized environmental management system (EMS). Our results are consistent with empirical evidence in several respects. A standardized EMS increases the internal control at the cost of introducing some degree...

We study the incentives induced by the adoption of a Code of Best Practice. Using an agency model, we analyze whether and when firms are interested in adopting a Code that allows the shareholder to reduce the manager's discretion. Our results suggest that if a voluntary Code is available, not...

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a...

The aim of this paper is to analyze how employees may affect firm's corporate governance. In particular, we analyze a shareholder-manager relationship through a principal-agent framework. The manager is the agent in charge of taking decisions for firm's success. Yet, when deciding, the manager...

This paper examines the strategic use of forward contracts in an industry where downstream firms must buy an essential input from imperfectly competitive upstream suppliers. When a single large firm and a fringe of firms exist downstream, the large firm buys forward contracts from the fringe,...

We analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolistto a continuum of heterogeneous downstream firms. The novelty of ourapproach is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly, whichintroduces an interesting trade-off. As a consequence, partial pricediscrimination arises...

In this paper, the implementation of some schemes proposed in the literature for allocating emissions permits among pollutant firms, given a cap on total national emissions, is examined in the context of firms exerting market power in the (intermediate) emissions permits market. For that, we...

We study the incentives to firms to create divisions once the vertical structure of an industry is taken into account. Downstream firms, those that must buy an essential input from upstream firms, may create divisions. Divisionalization reduces their bargaining power against upstream firms. This...