This paper investigates the impact of determination of an original initiator of transmission on demand as well as profits of the providers. For that purpose we present a new model, called differentiated traffic-based interconnection agreement (DTIA) that differentiates traffic into two types,...

Cost allocation between interconnected networks is based on measured traffic flows. This principle, however, does not provide a fair way for sharing costs. In this paper, a new bilateral model, called Differentiated Traffic-based Interconnection Agreement (DTIA) for intercarrier compensation is...

In terms of intercarrier compensation traffic flows are measured to allocate the costs between networks. This method provides a poor basis for sharing any costs. In this work we analyze the benefits of the traffic differentiation on the interconnection charges in unilateral and bilateral...

This paper addresses the inter-provider costs sharing issue by exploring the effect of the traffic differentiation on the interconnection payments. In particular, we determine an original initiator of a transmission by means of traffic differentiation into two types, referred to as native and...

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...

We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...

We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...

We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the first and second welfare theorems and, when agents'...

We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not exhibit a supply chain...