Despite descriptive empirical evidence on start-up numbers and survival rates of young firms, the interaction of market entry decisions and reactions of incumbent competitors is still insufficiently understood in the entrepreneurship literature. Repeated games offer a suitable theoretical...

This paper is concerned with the subject of how the three main approaches to model aggregate fluctuations are related. That is, we are interested in the relation between real business cycle models, endogenous business cycle models and sunspot equilibria models. It is shown that there exists an...

This paper considers an investment timing problem in a dipole framework. The results of the seminal contribution by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985, RES) are extended by introduction of uncertainty. Three scenarios are identified. In the first scenario we have a preemption equilibrium with dispersed...

I present and study an evolutionary model of immigration and culturaltransmission of social norms in a set-up where agents are repeatedly matchedto play a one-shot interaction prisoner´s dilemma. Matching can be non-randomdue to limited integration (or population viscosity). The latter refers...

We study the development of an industry-evolution of capacity, production and prices- in a continuous-time real-options model under various assumptions on competition. Investment takes the form of sequential acquisition of indivisible units of capacity. As benchmarks, we determine the optimal...

We apply the stochastic evolutionary approach of equilibrium selection to macroeconomic models in which a complementarity at the macro level is present. These models often exhibit multile Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria , and the best response-correspondence of an individual increases with a...

In this paper (reinforcement) learning of decision makers that face many different games is studied. As learning separately for all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents are assumed to partition the set of all games into analogy classes. Partitions of higher...

In this paper a stylized labour contarct model is constructed where it is shown that when contracts are enforced by a specific performance rule, then above mentioned unfortunate features emerge. Thse features 'disappear' when the environment is amended by assuming that the court uses an at-will...

This paper considers a class of two-player dynamic games in which each player controls a one-dimensional variable which we interpret as a level of cooperation. In the base model, there is an irreversibility constraint stating that this variable can never be reduced, only increased. It otherwise...

We show that asymmetric equilibria may exist in an ex ante symmetric step-by-step R&D if product market competition is intense. The corresponding symmetric equilibrium is unstable and therefore less likely the one selected, while the asymmetric ones result in lower economic growth (reversing...