In sender-receiver games high-quality types can distinguish themselves from low-quality types by sending a costly signal. Allowing for additional, noisy information on sender types can radically alter sender behavior in such games. We examine equilibria where medium types separate themselves...

Some social scientists argue that the widespread of cooperation within societies is the fact that modern economics theory fails to capture. Fukuyama, for example, argues that economics fails to take into account cultural factors affecting individual behaviors (Fukuyama 1995). Trust, as he...

Analysts make competing claims about when and how politicians can use fear to gain support for suboptimal policies. Using a model, we clarify how common attributes of fear affect politicians’ abilities to achieve self-serving outcomes that are bad for voters. In it, a politician provides...

We study finitely repeated 2 / 2 normal form games, where players have incomplete information about their opponents’ payoffs. In a laboratory experiment we investigate whether players (a) learn the game they are playing, (b) learn to predict the behavior of their opponent, and (c) learn to...

A multi-agent model of travelers competing to utilize a roadway in time and space is presented in this paper to illustrate the effect of congestion and pricing on traveler behaviors and network equilibrium. To realize the spillover effect among travelers, N-player games are constructed in which...

The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. Companies realise innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new employees coming from another company or academia....

This paper proposes a stochastic congestion and pricing model that combines a bottleneck model with stochastic queuing to study roadway congestion and pricing. Employing this model, two pricing schemes are developed: one is omniscient pricing for which the transportation administrative agency is...

In this article, we study the emergence of coordination in repeated Sender-Receiver games with common interests when the messages have no common meaning before the game starts. We define axiomatic interpretation rules of the histories and study the resulting language-free signaling equilibria...

This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among bounded rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end ; and forego immediate payoffs if the...