A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...

A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...

We study a seller that starts with an initial inventory of goods, has a target horizon over which to sell the goods, and is subject to a set of financial <i>milestone</i> constraints on the revenues and sales that need to be achieved at different time points along the sales horizon. We characterize the...

We analyze a dynamic auction, in which a seller with C units to sell faces a sequence of buyers separated into T time periods. Each group of buyers has independent, private values for a single unit. Buyers compete directly against each other within a period, as in a traditional auction, and...

No abstract available.

This paper considers a profit-maximizing make-to-order manufacturer that offers multiple products to a market of price and delay sensitive users, using a model that captures three aspects of particular interest: first, the joint use of dynamic pricing and lead-time quotation controls to manage...

We consider the optimization problem of a decision maker facing a sequence of coin tosses with an initially unknown probability Θ for heads. Before each toss she bets on either heads or tails and she wins one euro if she guesses correctly, otherwise she loses one euro. We investigate the effect...

We consider the optimization problem of a decision maker facing a sequence of coin tosses with an initially unknown probability Θ for heads. Before each toss she bets on either heads or tails and she wins one euro if she guesses correctly, otherwise she loses one euro. We investigate the effect...

We experimentally explore the effects of time pressure on decision making. Under different time allowance conditions, subjects are presented with a queueing situation and asked to join one of two queues that differ in length, server speed, and entry fee. The results can be grouped under two main...

We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of the two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly...