game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any … definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be …

, such as the exploration of stable solutions for matching and exchange, the measurement of power and a deeper understanding …

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows … us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the …

misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate … problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the payoffs of a matching can be …

game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any … definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be …