This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyze how his decision...

Im klassischen Modell von Diamond und Dybvig (1983) werden Bank-runs durch sich selbst erfüllende pessimistische Erwartungen der Anleger provoziert. Sie sind damit ein Sonnenflecken-Phänomen. Die spekulativen Runs können u.a. durch eine Einlagenversicherung vermieden werden. Allerdings...

In this paper a modified version of Bernanke and Blinder�s (1988) model of the bank lending channel of monetary policy under asymmetric information is presented. If, aside from reserve requirements, banks have to meet capital adequacy requirements as well, then the results suggested by...

Contrary to what is consistently assumed in the literature, the return function cannot be hump-shaped in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) model. This has important consequences for the possible occurrence of credit rationing and redlining. With a single class of borrowers, banks offer credit in two...