-route funds to politicians as a form of indirect election finance. One observable implication is that the demand for cement, the …In developing countries where elections are costly and accountability mechanisms weak, politicians often turn to … illicit means of financing campaigns. This paper examines one such channel of illicit campaign finance: India’s real estate …

Theory provides many explanations about the influence of electoral rules on politicians’ equilibrium behavior. With a … politicians’ rents than proportional representation. To sidestep the identification problems of previous empirical studies based …

, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected … empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is … in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament …

politicians’ rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House …

, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected … empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is … in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament …

Using rainfall, public relief, and election data from India, we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and … rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election. In accordance with these electoral … incentives, governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years. These results describe how failures in …

politicians to ingratiate themselves with partisans, may actually strengthen their incentives to engage in electioneering. …