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Taylor, Curtis R. - Duke University, Department of Economics - 2003

Personal privacy is studied in the context of a competitive product (or labor) market. In the first stage of the game, firms that sell homogeneous goods or services (e.g., insurance, credit, or rental housing) post prices they promise to charge approved applicants. In the second stage, each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114030

Corruption with Competition Among Hidden Principals

Weinschelbaum, Federico - Departamento de Economía, Universidad de San Andrés - 2000

Generally when there is increased competition on one side of the market, the other side is better off. We study the … effects of increased competition among sellers when there is a potentially corrupt agent who procures the good on behalf of a … incurred from being corrupt). The effects of increased competition among suppliers depend crucially on whether new suppliers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034890

New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility

Jullien, Bruno; Park, In-Uck - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2009

We show that sellers may earn reputation for their \ability" to deliver high quality goods on average by honestly announcing the realised quality of items for sale every period. As the expected revenue stream from continuing with honest communication increases with their ability, high ability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465336

New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility

Jullien, Bruno; Park, In-Uck - Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540629

Reputation and Punishment in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players.

Evans, R.; Thomas, J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207836

Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information

Thomas, Jonathan P.; Cripps, Martin - EconWPA - 2000

The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550893

Cooperation and Punishment

Thomas, Jonathan P.; Evans, Robert - EconWPA - 2000

We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results require that the perturbations must include strategies which are `draconian' in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407513

Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication

Jullien, Bruno; Park, In-Uck - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2011

We characterize the unique equilibrium in which high ability sellers always announce the quality of their items truthfully, in a repeated game model of experienced good markets with adverse selection on a seller's propensity to supply good quality items. In this equilibrium a seller's value...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009370152

What is a good reputation? Career concerns with heterogeneous audiences

Bar-Isaac, Heski; Deb, Joyee - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 34 (2014) C, pp. 44-50

When an agent faces audiences with heterogeneous preferences, it is non-trivial to determine what a “good” reputation means, and the return to reputation can be a non-monotonic function. We illustrate this through standard IO examples, and discuss some implications for reputation-building in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051629

Cotton manufacturers as bankers: the textile trade and credit in spain (1840-1913)

Sabartes, Marc Prat - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2008

Historians claim that in the nineteenth century Catalan cotton manufacturers were giving informal credit to their clients, and were therefore unable to transfer this credit to the banking system. Such circumstances would have had a detrimental effect on the profitability of the cotton firms....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005176404

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