We present a new type of field experiment to investigate ethnic prejudice in the workplace. Our design allows us to study how potential discriminators respond to changes in the cost of discrimination. We find that ethnic discrimination is common but remarkably responsive to the "price of...

We present a new type of field experiment to investigate ethnic prejudice in the workplace. Our design allows us to study how potential discriminators respond to changes in the cost of discrimination. We find that ethnic discrimination is common but remarkably responsive to the "price of...

We experimentally manipulate agents' information regarding the rationality of others in a setting in which previous studies have found irrationality to be present, namely the asset market experiments introduced by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (Econometrica, 1988). Recent studies suggest that...

We challenge the recent claim that mispricing in the experimental asset markets introduced by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) is merely an artefact of confusion over declining fundamental value, and can be eliminated through appropriate training. We instead propose that when training is...

We experimentally manipulate agents' information regarding the rationality of others in a setting in which previous studies have found irrationality to be present, namely the asset market experiments introduced by Smith et al. (1988). Recent studies suggest that mispricing in such markets may be...

Instructors can use a computerized experiment to introduce students to imperfect competition in courses on introductory economics, industrial organization, game theory, and strategy and management. In addition to introducing students to strategic thinking in general, the experiment serves to...

In a laboratory experiment designed to capture key aspects of the interaction between physicians and patients in a stylized way, we study the effects of medical insurance and competition in the guise of free choice of physician. Medical treatment is an example of a credence good: only the...

We study risk taking on behalf of others, both when choices involve losses and when they do not. We conduct a large-scale incentivized experiment with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish population. On average, decision makers take the same risks for other people as for themselves when...

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions,...

We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of...