We analyze the importance of personal attributes in explaining the performance of reported share transactions by corporate insiders. While prior literature has focused on observable firm and trade characteristics, little effort has been made to understand how individual attributes, such as...

This study provides new insights into the link between local stock-market development and the demand for cross-listing. Analyzing 14 Central and Eastern European stock markets over two decades, we find that the link is non-monotonic: cross-listing activity first grows and then decreases as the...

We argue that insiders' decisions to trade in short windows before news announcements are likely to result from a trade-off between the incentives to capitalize on the foreknowledge of the disclosure and the risk of regulatory scrutiny and reputation loss. We provide evidence that the decision...

In this article we test the influence of ownership structure on the information content of earnings in Polish-listed companies. Our investigation is based on the notion that in a weak corporate governance environment expropriation of private benefits of control is pervasive and manipulation of...

We argue that insiders' decisions to trade in short windows before news announcements are likely to result from a trade-off between the incentives to capitalize on the foreknowledge of the disclosure and the risk of regulatory scrutiny and lost reputation. We provide evidence that insider buying...

We use a unique data set of more than 240,000 reported insider transactions across 15 European countries and the USA to analyze the link between country-level shareholder protection and abnormal returns following insider trades. We show that abnormal returns after insider transactions are...

This paper investigates the relationship between market reaction to earnings surprises and institutional concentration in the firm?s shareholders base. We use data from the Polish stock market where pension funds form a homogenous and highly competitive investor class with an increasing share in...

Previous literature documents that executives tend to cash out equity incentives when equity-linked compensation vests. Such a behavior destroys long-term incentives and hence is costly to outside shareholders. It is recommended that the unloading of incentives can be limited when the firm...