Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of … banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to … occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via …

monitoring frequency of borrowers' main bank do not change significantly at the time of collateral being pledged. (3) The …

integration of commercial and investment banking in one organizational unit where bank managers accomplish both activities. We … other task. When there is no managerial moral hazard, it is not optimal for the bank to form a conglomerate. We show that … under managerial moral hazard, forming a conglomerate may be in the bank's interest because it may entail lower agency costs …

firme. Mais la théorie des contrats prouve la nécessité pour la banque d’une attitude stricte pour limiter l’aléa moral. La … théorie bancaire montre que si la banque dispose d'un avantage informationnel par rapport aux tiers, elle peut adopter un …

The role of information’s processing in bank intermediation is a crucial input. The bank has access to different types … a bank relationship, is qualitative and non verifiable, therefore manipulable, but produces more precise estimation of … to the banker but requires particular organizational modifications within the bank, as it allows to reduce capital …