Credit contracting between a lender with market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to the rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by government support in the form of...

This paper studies optimal taxation of entrepreneurial capital with private information and multiple assets. Entrepreneurial activity is subject to a dynamic moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic capital risk. We first characterize the optimal allocation subject to the...

This paper studies optimal taxation of entrepreneurial capital with private information and multiple assets. Entrepreneurial activity is subject to a dynamic moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic capital risk. We first characterize the optimal allocation subject to the...

Credit contracting between a lender with a market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to a rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when an adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by a government support in the form of...

Credit contracting between a lender with monopoly market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to the rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs. This inefficiency may be eliminated by government support in the form of credit guarantees or interest...

Provision of credit guarantees or subsidies may remove an adverse selection leading to credit rationing. This paper concentrates on comparison of government budget costs of credit guarantees and subsidies in a monopolistic credit market. Di?erent opportunity costs among entrepreneurs, which...

Venture capitalists not only finance but also advise and thereby add value to young innovative firms. The prospects of venture capital backed firms thus depend on joint efforts of entrepreneurs and informed venture capitalists, and are subject to double moral hazard. In financing a portfolio of...

The traditional avoidance literature undeservedly neglects tax base distribution as a factor affecting the avoidance price, and generally assumed to be equal to the avoidance cost. In reality, avoidance providers are usually either high-skilled specialists or insiders. The strong collusion thus,...

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