breakdown of a German cement cartel. We find that, first, after the breakdown of the cartel, cartel members reduce net prices to … a far larger extent than gross prices and that, second, noncartel members slip under the price umbrella of the cartel to … transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the pricing dynamics during and after the …

We test econometrically whether the sole Danish producer of cement holds a dominant <p> position in the Danish market … for (grey) cement. In import penetration tests, we find that its <p> pricing and quantity decisions are independent of … import price and quantity, implying that it can <p> act to a considerable extent independently of its competitors. We also …

analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently (See www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/cfd). The CFD cartel-audit should … cartels cause failures in the observed process patterns. The CFD cartel-audit attempts to draw conclusions from these process …

. Effective private enforcement requires that cartel victims can receive (at least) full compensation for the harm suffered …. Academics and competition authorities support this goal with guidance for the calculation of cartel damages. However, they … several years until cartel victims obtain damages. Interest and inflation are thus two key drivers of adequate compensation …

price screen would have allowed particularly larger customers to detect the upstream cement cartel before the competition …Cartel detection is usually viewed as a key task of either competition authorities or compliance officials in firms … set of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers and show that a …

hypothesis is then taken to the German cement cartel of 1991-2002. We argue that Readymix was such a discontent cartel member and …We hypothesize a particular source of cartel instability and explore its relevance to understanding cartel dynamics …. The cartel instability is rooted in the observation that, upon cartel formation, the relative positions of firms are often …

we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the maximal cartel price, the largest price for which the … conditions for sustainability hold. We analyze how the maximal cartel price supported by different cartel strategies adjusts in … enforcement, leniency, and cartel strategies on the maximal cartel price. Ex-ante leniency cannot reduce the maximal cartel price …

antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics …For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …