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Three Minimal Market Institutions with Human and Algorithmic Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Huber, Juergen; Shubik, Martin; Sunder, Shyam - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007
the predictions of theory. These closed exchange economies have some cash to facilitate transactions, and include feedback …. The experiment reveals that (1) the competitive general equilibrium (CGE) and non-cooperative (NCE) models are reasonable … dominates the others across six measures of performance. Inclusion of some mechanism differences into theory may enhance our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545754
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Three Minimal Market Institutions with Human and Algorithmic Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Huber, Juergen; Shubik, Martin; Sunder, Shyam - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007
) in laboratory relative to the predictions of theory. Unlike open or partial equilibrium settings of most other …. General equilibrium theory, since it abstracts away from market mechanisms and has no role for money or credit, makes no … of feedback from buying an endowed good is missed. Inclusion of mechanism differences into theory may enhance our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979387
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Choosing whether to compete: Price and format competition with consumer confusion
Crosetto, P.; Gaudeul, A. - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée de Grenoble, … - 2014
We run a market experiment where subjects take the role of firms and can choose not only their price but also whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939418
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Choosing whether to compete: Price and format competition with consumer confusion
Crosetto, Paolo; Gaudeul, Alexia - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
We run a market experiment where firms can choose not only their price but also whether to present comparable offers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942823
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Sick Pay Provision in Experimental Labor Markets
Dürsch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Vadovic, Radovan - Alfred-Weber-Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, … - 2008
Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental gift-exchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate sick pay in the same way as they reciprocate wage payments?...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150948
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Blowing the Whistle
Apesteguia, Jose; Dufwenberg, Martin; Selten, Reinhard - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet - 2003
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771101
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Blowing the Whistle
Apesteguía, José; Dufwenberg, Martin; Selten, Reinhard - Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra - 2003
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067339
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Price Floors and Competition
Dufwenberg, Martin; Gneezy, Uri; Goeree, Jacob K.; … - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet - 2002
A potential source of instability of many economic models is that agents have little incentive to stick with the equilibrium. We show experimentally that this may matter with price competition. The control variable is a price floor, which increases the cost of deviating from equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005648549
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Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities
Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014
We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders’ contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106491
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Blowing the Whistle
Apesteguia, José; Dufwenberg, Martin; Selten, Reinhard - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989614