We investigate policy reform in a model with both lobbying, which involves a free-rider problem, and ordinary rent seeking, which does not. These activities involve similar skills, so a reform which reduces rents shifts labor into lobbying. Also, because of the free-rider problem, the marginal...

Policy towards speculative bubbles is examined in a model of a finite horizon 'greater fool' bubble, with rational agents, asymmetric information and short-sales constraints. This model permits the use of standard tools of comparative dynamics and welfare economics to analyze bubble policies....

An asymmetric information model of a finite horizon "nth order" rational asset price bubble is presented, where (all agents know that)-super-n the asset is worthless. Also, the model has only two agents, so the first order version of the bubble is simpler than other first order bubbles in the...

This paper presents simple new multisignal generalizations of the two classic methods used to justify the first-order approach to moral hazard principal-agent problems, and compares these two approaches with each other. The paper first discusses limitations of previous generalizations. Then a...