Some of the best-known results in mechanism design depend critically on Myerson’s (Math Oper Res 6:58–73, <CitationRef CitationID="CR22">1981</CitationRef>) regularity condition. For example, the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main findings....</citationref>

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

A consistent pair specifies a set of "rational" strategies for both players such that a strategy is rational if and only if it is a best reply to a Bayesian belief that gives positive probability to every rational strategy of the opponent and probability zero otherwise. Although the idea...

This paper contributes to the existing literature on central bank repoauctions. It is based on a structural econometric approach, whereby the primitives of bidding behavior (individual bid schedules and bid-shading components) are directly estimated. With the estimated parameters we calibrate a...

In competitive procurement auctions, bids often have the form of unit-price contracts (UPCs). We show that optimal bidding behavior in UPC auctions is typically nonmonotonic and therefore may lead to inefficient allocations. However, UPC auctions may still be desirable for the buyer when...

When the price of an input factor to a production process increases, then the optimal output level declines and the input is substituted by other factors. Marshall's rule is a formula that determines the own-price elasticity for one factor as a weighted sum of the elasticities of output market...

The sum of a supermodular function, assumed nondecreasing in the choice variable, and of a 'concavely supermodularizable' function, assumed nonincreasing in the parameter variable, satisfies the Milgrom-Shannon (1994, Monotone comparative statics, Econometrica 62, 157-180) single crossing...