Showing 1 - 10 of 13,369
corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009404621
This note develops a model of two stage game between a corrupt trade union leader and the management of the firm where the former negotiates for the wage of the workers with the firm. The firm bribes the leader so that he keeps the wage as close as possible to the workers’ reservation wage....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261141
This paper presents an analysis of the effect of bureaucratic corruption on economic growth through a public finance …. Corruption takes the form of the embezzlement of public funds, the effect of which is to increase the government’s reliance on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181368
While financial development and corruption control have been studied extensively, their interaction has not. We develop … a simple model in which low corruption and financial development both facilitate the undertaking of productive projects …, but act as substitutes in doing so. The substitutability arises because corruption raises the need for liquidity and thus …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585309
This paper examines the relationship between corruption and public debt in 106 countries. Results suggest that … corruption leads to an increase in public debt. We also investigate if the effect of corruption on pblic debt is increased by … government expenditure, the shadow economy and military expenditure. We find that the effect of corruption on public debt is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010720687
corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108750
can countries get trapped in a bribing equilibrium forever? Corruption and lobbying are to some extent substitutes. By …) an equilibrium with corruption discourages firms to invest, (ii) firms bribe if the level of development is low, but (iii … become an equilibrium. The outcome is a poverty trap with pervasive corruption. This poverty trap is more likely if penalties …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661993
In this paper, we test the Rodrik et al (2004) framework to explain differences in development levels across countries by using a broader set of definitions for institutions, geography and economic variables. We use a multi-faceted database to measure institutions in an attempt to go beyond the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856330
Auxiliary institutions fail to perform the function of protecting economic agents’ trust in the liquidity of various monetary obligations. Still, despite these conclusions, there exist some forms of monetary arrangements that seemingly demonstrate a high level of trust among their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860878
Apart from altruistic reasons, NGOs may engage in developing countries under conditions of conflict and war in order to secure funding and survive in the ‘market’ of humanitarian relief and development assistance. Applying a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach, we analyze...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010886852