This article develops a strategic trading model in which the outsider is overconfident on the shared information. Our result shows that a more confident outsider underreacts to his information in the sense that he trades less aggressively on his information, leading to a less profit in the...

Fixed point theorems are the standard tool used to prove the existence of equilibria in mathematical economics. This paper shows how to prove a slight generalization of Brouwer's and Kakutani's fixed point theorems using the familiar techniques of drawing and shifting curves in the plane and is,...

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of permitting firms to negotiate contractually the right to allow corporate insiders to trade shares in the firm on private information. A computational framework is employed to (i) analyze formally the effects of insider trading on managerial investment...

Several models predict that both market liquidity and trading volume generated by less informed traders do not increase when there is insider trading. Available empirical evidence is mixed and still relatively small, because of the inherent di¢ culty to identify insider trading events. Our...

The single auction equilibrium of Kyle's (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially informed, or alternatively they can be manipulated. Unlike Kyle's assumption that the quantity traded by the noise traders is independent of the asset value, we assume that the noise traders are...

Issues related to insider trading remain popular research topics. Empirical studies using historical data are limited by two key factors: 1) the inability to identify exactly who possesses inside information, and 2) the inability to identify the accuracy of information possessed. Advances in...

We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A model is presented where two market makers with two different information partitions compete in prices. At each stage a bid-ask auction between...

We study the efficiency of the equilibrium price in a centralized, order-driven market where many asymmetrically informed traders are active for many periods. We show that asymmetries of information can lead to sub-optimal information revelation with respect to the symmetric case. In particular,...

We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A Bayesian game is proposed in which there is price competition between two market makers with two different information partitions. At each...