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Schelling [1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents' preferences, i.e., no agent preferring the resulting segregation. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345745
Stochastic learning models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the noise level of the learning process is taken to zero.  The difficulty is that, when the noise is extremely small, it can take an extremely long time for a large population to reach the stochastically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320946
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005706828
Schelling [1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents' preferences, i.e., no agent preferring the resulting segregation. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005106362
In this paper, I analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations of myopic best repliers, better repliers and imitators. In each period, one individual from each of n populations, one for each player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190858
In this paper we model an evolutionary process with perpetual random shocks where individual behavior is determined by imitation. Every period an agent is randomly chosen from each of n finite populations to play a game. Each agent observes a sample of population-specific past strategy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649201
In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649353
Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce ''cleverness'' of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649382
in the US airline industry. Our results are based on the estimation of a dynamic oligopoly game of network competition … services associated with the scale of operation of an airline in the hub airport (e.g., more convenient check-in and landing … facilities); (2) operating costs and entry costs in a route may decline with an airline's scale operation in origin and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704829
in the US airline industry. Our results are based on the estimation of a dynamic oligopoly game of network competition … associated with the scale of operation of an airline in the hub airport; (2) operating costs and entry costs in a route may … decline with the airline's scale of operation in the origin and destination airports (e.g., economies of scale and scope); and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005037744