"We examine provider and patient behavior in a dynamic model where effort is noncontractible, competition between providers is modeled in an explicit way and where patients' outside options are solved for in equilibrium. Physicians are characterized by an individual-specific ethical constraint...

In this paper, we examine provider and patient behaviour where effort is non-contractible and where competition between providers is modeled in an explicit way. More specifically, we construct a model where physicians repeatedly compete for patients and where patients’ outside options are...

This paper analyzes and compares the incentive properties of some common payment mechanisms for GPs, namely fee for service (FFS), capitation and fundholding. It focuses on gatekeeping GPs and it specifically recognizes GPs heterogeneity in both ability and altruism. It also allows inappropriate...

In this paper, two results are presented. Both refer to the impossibility theorem of Polemarchakis (1983). The Slutsky matrix of intratemporal and intertemporal substitution effects, associated with the individual short-run demand functions, is not arbitrary, but symmetric, if expectations are...

In this paper : a) the consumer's problem is studied over two periods, the second one involving S states, and the consumer being endowed with S+1 incomes and having access to N financial assets; b) the consumer is then representable by a continuously differentiable system of demands, commodity...

In the Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976] model of a competitive insurance market with adverse selection, pooling equilibria cannot exist. However in practice, pooling contracts are frequent, notably in health insurance and life insurance. This is due to the fact that distribution costs are...

This paper analyzes and compares the incentive properties of some common payment mechanisms for GPs, namely fee for service (FFS), capitation and fundholding. It focuses on gatekeeping GPs and it speci…cally recognizes GPs heterogeneity in both ability and altruism. It also allows inappropriate...

This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing gatekeeping general practitioners (GPs) to select their payment mechanism. We model GPs’ behavior under the most common payment schemes (capitation and fee for service) and when GPs can select one among them. Our analysis considers GP...