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Fight Alone or Together? The Need to Belong
Ke, Changxia - Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und öffentliche … - 2011
This study compares contests with exogenous alliance formation under proportional sharing rules with contests among individual players in a laboratory setting. The standard equilibrium predictions are identical for all players because the proportional rule ensures the same payoff incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990329
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Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und öffentliche … - 2012
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990338
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"Success breeds success" or "Pride goes before a fall"? Teams and Individuals in Best-of-Three Contests
Fu, Qiang; Ke, Changxia; Tan, Fangfang - Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und öffentliche … - 2013
for one part of the production task. Particularly, we employ a real-effort laboratory experiment to examine how team …We study the impact of progress feedback in team-production contests, in which each team member is solely responsible … members react to the feedback in team-based (best-of-three) contests and whether it differs from that of individual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990345
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Endogenous group formation in experimental contests
Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860231
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The Impact of Management Incentives in Intergroup Contests
Eisenkopf, Gerald - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Konstanz - 2013
In intergroup contests a manager advises and motivates her group’s members. Her rewards often depend on the subsequent contest expenditure of the members. I test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager’s efforts. In the different experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883486
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Alliances in the shadow of conflict
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) - 2012
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956225
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Can't Touch This! Similarity And Willingness to Keep "Dirty Money"
Johnson, David; Goerg, Sebastian; Rogers, Jonathan - Department of Economics, University of Calgary - 2014
is provided to subjects in a traditional laboratory experiment. We find no significantcant differences in the proposer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960259
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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjaša; Madies, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011214041
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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjaša; Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251784
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Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence
De Luca, Giacomo; Sekeris, Petros; Spengler, Dominic - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015
While folk theorems for dynamic renewable common pool resource games sustain cooperation as an equilibrium, the possibility of reverting to violence to appropriate the resource destroys the incentives to cooperate, because of the expectation of conflict when resources are sufficiently depleted....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011262754