This paper considers the optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions...

This paper considers the optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions...

We study a business cycle model in which a benevolent …scal authority must determine the optimal provision of government services, while lacking credibility, lump-sum taxes, and the ability to bond fi…nance de…ficits. Households and the fi…scal authority have risk sensitive pref- erences. We...

This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy optimally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking the Smets-Wouters model as the central banks approximating model, the papers main fi…ndings are as follows. First, a central...

This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy optimally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking the Smets-Wouters model as the central bank's approximating model, the paper's main findings are as follows. First, a central...

Central to the conduct of monetary policy are inflation forecasts. Inflation forecast are not unique. Central banks and professional organizations generate inflation forecasts while households are surveyed about their inflation outlook. This paper estimates inflation forecast disagreement for...

Model uncertainty has the potential to change importantly how monetary policy is conducted, making it an issue that central banks cannot ignore. Using a standard new Keynesian business cycle model, this paper analyzes the behavior of a central bank that conducts policy under discretion while...

Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot co- ordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. In order to utilize the explanatory power of models with...

We study a business cycle model in which a benevolent fiscal authority must determine the optimal provision of government services, while lacking credibility, lump-sum taxes, and the ability to bond finance deficits. Households and the fiscal authority have risk sensitive preferences. We find...

An important issue in small open-economies is whether policymakers should respond to exchange rate movements when they formulate monetary policy. Micro-founded models tend to suggest that there is little to be gained from responding to exchange rate movements, and the literature has largely...