We study the impact of import protection on relationship-specific investments, organizational choice and welfare. We show that a tariff on intermediate inputs can improve social welfare through mitigating hold-up problems. It does so if it discriminates in favor of the investing parties, which...

We explore the two-way relationship between corporate culture and market structure. We emphasize two market dimensions through which firms interact: the product market where goods are sold and the labor market where managers are hired. We model the firm's principal–agent relationship by...

Lex mercatoria or Law Merchant (‘LM’) is said to be the self-made law of international commerce. According to its proponents, LM is an autonomous legal order that not only supplements state commercial law, but works as a substitute for it. The ‘ancient’ LM, which accompanied the...

This paper analyzes the dynamics of Colombian exports to the Venezuelan market, the characteristics of the firms that ship goods to this destination and the dependence of their revenues on sales to Venezuela. The results show that the Venezuelan market shipments affect the evolution, structure...

En este documento se analiza la reciente disminución de las exportaciones a Venezuela y su impacto en el panorama exportador y las firmas colombianas. Al mismo tiempo se plantean algunas reflexiones sobre la sustitución del mercado venezolano. Para esto se utilizó la base de comercio exterior...

En este documento se analiza la reciente disminución de las exportaciones a Venezuela y su impacto en el panorama exportador y las firmas colombianas. Al mismo tiempo se plantean algunas reflexiones sobre la sustitución del mercado venezolano. Para esto se utilizó la base de comercio exterior...

Increased market access from Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) promised by policy makers is often diluted by preferential rules of origin (ROO). This paper discusses two policy options one direct, and one indirect -- with regard to limiting the impact of NAFTA ROO on trade, and illustrates the impact...

This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be achieved, if punishment for deviation from an agreement is limited to a...

This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Free trade can never be achieved if punishment for deviation from a trade agreement is limited to a 'withdrawal of equivalent concessions.'...

We raise the possibility that at least some of the free trade areas observed in practice are customs unions in disguise. We distinguish between generalized and standard customs unions. While members of the former can choose different external tariff rates, members of the latter levy a common...