We investigate government subsidy policies in which a home firm and a foreign firm choose to strategically set prices or quantities in a third market. We show that even though each firm can earn higher profits under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition regardless of the nature of...

This paper presents a two-stage game, in which in the first stage two multinational firms (MNFs) seeking pollution havens choose a location, that is, whether to export to or undertake FDI in the host country, and in the second stage, these two MNFs and a firm in the host country play a Cournot...

Employing the micro data for 1997--2004, we investigate the location decision of Korean-affiliated manufacturing investments in the United States. The conditional logit estimates confirm that although industry-specific Korean agglomeration and domestic agglomeration play an important role, the...

type="main" <p>In this paper, we develop a location model of two multi-national firms (MNFs) with reverse imports and examine the consistency of MNFs' location shift in terms of social welfare in the foreign direct investment (FDI) source (home) country. If fixed costs are incurred in FDI, trade...</p>

We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only the public firm is able to choose a type of contract irrespective of whether...