This paper investigates how information affect voting behaviour. There exist a large literature suggesting that uninformed voters can use informational shortcuts or cues to vote as if they were informed. This paper tests this hypothesis using unique Swedish individual survey data on the...

This Paper shows that over monitoring a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine loyalty and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. This intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we lose the opportunity to learn how the...

I study the constrained efficient allocations of a simple model of risk sharing and capital flows across countries assuming that each country cannot commit to fully repay its contract obligations. In the model, the degree of risk sharing and the amount of investment are interdependent. It is...

We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In...

This paper examines the role of liability for past environmental contamination in the privatization processes of Central and Eastern Europe. The theoretical section establishes a link between a risk-averse investor’s amount of information regarding the extent of past environmental...

In complete markets economies (Sandroni [15]), or in economies with Pareto optimal outcomes (Blume and Easley [9]), the market selection hypothesis holds, as long as traders have identical discount factors. Traders who survive must have beliefs that merge with the truth. We show that in...

We analyze the contracting structure in a moral hazard setting with several agents whereoutput is produced jointly and is the only contractible variable. Since the salary of each agentis a function of all agents efforts, a positive externality arises between them. This externalityis not...

This paper derives the Nash-equilibrium degrees of commitment to a partnership where lack of full commitment fuels suspicion and increases potential losses for partners.

Constant risk aversion means that adding the same constant to all outcomes of two distributions, or multiplaying all their outcomes by the same positive constant, will not change the preformence relation between them. In this paper we prove several representation theorems, where constant risk...