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reinforcement of physician liability for off-label use may be the preferred instrument for achieving dynamic efficiency. The … liability threat reduces the demand for off-label use, giving manufacturers an appropriate incentive to invest in extended … approval. By contrast, patent prolongation does not affect physicians' prescription decisions and increases the likelihood of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036054
, the practicing physicians tend to be older and young doctors are becoming less willing to settle in their own surgery. To … cope with these challenges the Regional Associations of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians in Brandenburg …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123605
In Germany there is an ongoing debate on the adequate distribution of physicians that are obliged to guarantee the …. From a health economics point of view it has to be discussed which role physicians have to play within different forms of … organizing care and cure. In the paper, a standardized utility function that depicts physicians’ interest helps to figure out the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123606
General practitioner (GP) care in Germany is characterized by a disparate distribution of GPs. There is considerable oversupply in many urban areas while there is undersupply in many rural regions. Centralized planning of GP capacities so far has not been able to ameliorate this unequal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123607
legal rules that rarely converge to efficiency. The selection of disputes for litigation does not change this conclusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085092
To explore damage rules’ deterrent effect, we use a public good experiment to tailor allowable punishment to rules used in actual civil litigation. The experimental treatments are analogous to: (1) damages limited to harm to an individual litigant, (2) damages limited to harm to a group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541291
The paper addresses the issue of the impact of asymmetric information on risk aversion of litigant parties in a model à la Bebchuk. First we study the case where the plaintif is the informed party, and characterize the equilibrium with and without a pretrial negociation round. Then, we focuse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789358
We evaluate Richard Posner's famous hypothesis that common law converges to efficient legal rules using a model of precedent setting by appellate judges. Following legal realists, we assume that judicial decisions are subject to personal biases, and that changing precedent is costly to judges....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005720122
Does it matter for the outcome of a trial who the judge is? Legal practitioners typically believe that the answer is yes, yet legal scholarship sees trial judges as predictably enforcing established law. Following Frank (1951), we suggest here that trial judges exercise considerable discretion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005089213
The incentives of a plaintiff in a lawsuit are affected by a variety of legal rules. One leading example is the proportion of the fine imposed on the defendant that is awarded to the plaintiff. Another is the identity of the plaintiff himself: private litigants are motivated by the prospect of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051430