Used goods markets are currently important transaction channels for durable products. For some durable products, such markets first appeared when retailers started buying back used products from “old” customers and selling them to new ones for a profit (). The growth of electronic...

We consider a supply chain where a vendor manages its multiple retailers' stocks under a vendor managed inventory (VMI) contract that specifies upper stock limits at the retailers' premises and overstock costs for exceeding those limits. We formulate a mixed integer nonlinear program that...

This paper studies a competitive Hotelling-style market with two symmetric banks that decide the pricing and location of their automated teller machines (ATMs). Two different systems are considered: An unregulated model wherein banks are allowed to set surcharges, and a regulated model in which...

In this paper, we study a decentralized assembly system consisting of a single assembler who buys complementary components from independent suppliers under two contracting schemes: push and pull. In both schemes, the component suppliers are allowed to freely form coalitions (or alliances) among...

Independent parties that produce perfectly complementary components may form alliances (or coalitions or groups) to better coordinate their pricing decisions when they sell their products to downstream buyers. This paper studies how market demand conditions (i.e., the form of the demand...

The risk of supply disruption increases as firms seek to procure from cheaper, but unproven, suppliers. We model a supply chain consisting of a single buyer and two suppliers, both of which compete for the buyer's order and face risk of supply disruption. One supplier is comparatively more...

With the rapid expansion of global business, newer suppliers with cheaper but possibly unreliable technologies have entered the marketplace to win orders from buyer firms by beating the price of their perfectly reliable (but expensive) competitors. We model the procurement problem as a Nash game...