We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, "Reference Rules", to make core-selecting package auctions …

system. We demonstrate that the auction of Talman and Yang (2008) always generates a core allocation, thus resulting in a …

question of core stability of the grand coalition, namely: is there a subset of bidders that prefers forming a small bidding … the grand coalition is not necessarily core stable, as opposed to the zero externality case, where the stability of the …

In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function … core-stable. …

We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, “Reference Rules,” to make core-selecting package auctions …

and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome. …

and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome. …

actually ï¬nd a core allocation in ï¬nite steps, resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome. A core allocation consists of an …

In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function … core-stable. …

) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …