This paper argues that a guru possessing a multi-dimensional informational advantage may want to truthfully report her opinion to the media to learn more out of the actions of other, sometimes better-informed traders.

In a dynamic model of financial market trading multiple heterogeneously informed traders choose when to place orders. Better informed traders trade immediately, worse informed delay — even though they expect the public expectation to move against them. This behavior causes distinct intra-day...

This paper introduces uncertainty regarding the proportion of informed traders in a rational expectation equilibrium model with asymmetric information. The proportion uncertainty dramatically changes the properties of the resulting equilibrium. First, it may generate multiple nonlinear rational...

We study the properties of rational expectation equilibria (REE) in dynamic asset pricing models with heterogeneously informed agents. We show that under mild conditions the state space of such models in REE can be infinite dimensional. This result indicates that the domain of analytically...

We consider a noisy rational expectations equilibrium in a multi-asset economy populated by informed and uninformed investors, and noise traders. Informed investors privately observe an aggregate risk factor affecting the probabilities of different states of the economy. Uninformed investors...

The lack of access to financial services and to credit in particular is an issue in many developing countries. This paper studies the channels through which new borrowers get access to consumer loans and the effect of repayment data distribution both on that access and on subsequent bank...

How do traders process and learn from market information, what trading strategies should they use, and how does learning affect the market? This paper proposes a learning model of an articial limit order market with asymmetric information to address these issues. Using a genetic algorithm as a...

We study the implications of conformism among analysts in a CARA Gaussian model of the market for a risky asset, where a trader's information is a message sent by an analyst.  Conformism increases the weight of the public information in the messages, decreasing their informativeness.  More...

The paper constructs a search-theoretic model of credit markets with a bilateral trading mechanism that enables the manageable introduction of asymmetric information. Borrowers´ success probabilities are unobservable to financiers, but the degree of risk in observable projects can be used as a...

This article considers a two-sided private information model. We assume that two exogenouslygiven qualities are offered in a monopolistic market. Prices are fixed. A low quality seller choosesto be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higherprice). We...