In competition law, the problem of the optimal design of institutional and procedural rules concerns assessment processes of the pro- and anticompetitiveness of business behaviors. This is well recognized in the discussion about the relative merits of different assessment principles such as the...

Es vergeht kaum eine Woche, in der nicht neue, meistens grenzüberschreitende Fusionen verkündet werden. Die Zusammenschlüsse bieten nicht nur neue wirtschaftliche Chancen, sondern werfen auch Fragen nach einer Neugestaltung der internationalen Wettbewerbsordnung auf. In seinem Beitrag erteilt...

Am 28. und 29. November 2005 veranstaltete die Akademie für Politische Bildung Tutzing eine Tagung zum Thema "Macht und Verantwortung: Zu den Strategien und Einflussmöglichkeiten globaler Unternehmen". In seinem dort vorgestellten Referat beschäftigt sich Prof. Dr. Wernhard Möschel,...

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with...

Tacit collusion reduces welfare comparably to explicit collusion but remains mostly unaddressed by antitrust enforcement which greatly depends on evidence of explicit communication. We propose to target specific elements of firms’ behavior that facilitate tacit collusion by providing...

We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...

Most late 19th-century US economists gave a rather cool welcome to the Sherman Act (1890) and, though less harshly, to the Clayton and FTC Acts (1914). A large literature has identified several explanations for this surprising attitude, calling into play the relation between big business and...

This paper studies the application of leniency programs. An analysis of the structure and design of leniency programs and existing literature raises a new question: Are leniency programs effective, in the sense that they deter cartels from formation, in asymmetrical markets? A game theoretical...

This paper attempts to highlight the main principles of Competition Law (regulatory and case law framework) covering the prohibition of parallel imports and to reveal the main effects of it on the competitive structure of the market. Especially, the regulatory framework relates Block Exception...